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Shelley v. Kraemer:
Herald of Social Progress
and of the Coming Debate
Over the Limits
of Constitutional Change
by Thomas B. McAffee

This spring we have celebrated the
forty year anniversary of Jackie Robinson's breaking of the color barrier in
major league baseball. Next year will
be the fortieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v.
Kraemer,1 the case in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants. The temptation to
compare these events is irresistable,
for the surface similarities and differences are both quite striking. Robinson's self-consciously historical step
was national news, and he was greeted
throughout the country by thousands
of spectators, black and white; in St.
Louis in May, Robinson played before
the largest weekday crowd of the
National League season.2 Mr. and Mrs.
J.D. Shelley, on the other hand, moved
in at 4600 Labadie Avenue, in St.
Louis, on September 11, 1945, without
having received any actual notice that
the neighborhood was covered by
racially restrictive covenants to avoid
black entry beyond the five black
families that lived in the covered district when the covenants were signed.'
The Shelleys had no intention of
breaking any color barrier or establishing any test case; they simply wanted a
place to live and had noted that blacks
owned and occupied homes on the
4
same block.

Jackie Robinson entered the majors
with his eyes open to what he would
face -opposition, discrimination, and
a stomach full of hostility for his bold
decision to challenge an historical practice of discrimination. Indeed, he was
handpicked as the person best equipped
to play a particular role in an earthshaking drama. By contrast, the Shelleys'
black realtor arranged a dummy transaction to avoid a direct purchase from
an original signor of the restrictive
covenant, added an undisclosed
"premium" for his efforts, and allowed
them to move in without knowing what
they would face.5 Indeed, the St. Louis
trial judge ruled that the Shelleys took
the property without effective legal
notice of the covenant, given that the
realtor's interest was antagonistic to
theirs.' The evening that they moved
into their new home, however, the
Shelleys were served with the summons and complaint seeking enforcement of the terms of covenant.'
Even as the Shelleys' lawsuit grew
into a case of national significance, dif-

ferences with the Robinson "case"
stick out. In the second "Shelleys'
case," as one commentator described
it,' Shelleys' attorney, George L. Vaughn,
determined to push ahead to the Supreme Court with or without the blessing and assistance of Thurgood Marshall
and the national NAACP.' Indeed,
Marshall decided to go ahead and push

1. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
2. J. Tygiel, Jackie Robinson and His Legacy 189
(1983). The statements in text about Robinson
reflect materials drawn from this book.
3. C. Vose, Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the
NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases 109,
111 (1959).
4. Id. at 111.
5. Id. at 110-11.
6. Id.at 116.
7. Id. at 111.
8. Comment, Restrictive Covenants and Equal Protection -The New Rule in Shelley's Case, 21 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 358 (1948).
9. Despite the nationwide coordination efforts of the
NAACP as to legal strategy to overturn restrictive
covenants, Vaughn unilaterally filed a petition for
certiorari in Shelley on April 21, 1947. C. Vose,
supra note 3, at 157. As to Vaughn's general
independence from the national leaders, see id.
at 121.

Thomas B. McAffee received his B.S. in 1976 and his J.D. in 1979,.from the
University of Utah. He is currently Associate Professor of Law at Southern
Illinois University School of Law in Carbondale, Illinois.
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for the elimination of restrictive
covenants before the Supreme Court,
despite his personal reservations that
the time was not right, because the
Shelley case was going ahead, with or
without him.6 In short, Robinson was
handpicked for a special job; J.D.
Shelley, roughly speaking, fell into an
historic role, but then pursued it
with vigor.
Even so, in the bicentennial of our
Constitution, we have cause to recall
the case of J.D. Shelley, for the same
reasons that we observe Jackie Robinson's important anniversary. However
inadvertant his decision to purchase a
home in the "wrong" neighborhood,
Shelley made the decision to fight
against the injustice presented by
private racial discrimination in housing. At the personal level, this decision
no doubt required the same sort of
courage that Robinson's required.
Shelley was taking on the white American
establishment, as represented by
bankers, realtors groups, and neighborhood associations formed for the purpose of preserving white separatism
and supremacy. And while he represented the black race, as did Robinson, Shelley and his attorney pressed
the cause of justice without regard for
the support, material or spiritual, of
the "official" representatives of the
interests they sought to advance."

Beyond their personal courage,
however, Shelley and Robinson symbolize black America's quest for freedom,
justice, and human dignity. The segregation in housing and baseball were
appendages of a vast system of segregation, public and private, that permeated American life of the period.
And as Charles Black so eloquently
pointed out years later in defending
the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
the Board of Education," that system
of segregation operated for the purpose of stigmatizing the black race
with a badge of inferiority in support of
a regime of racial oppression. 3 While
ending segregation in baseball and
invalidating racial covenants in property would, by themselves, hardly dismantle that system of segregation and
oppression, they were steps along that
path and opportunities for the teaching of a national seminar on civil rights
and human dignity.
In the case of housing, the ending of
legally-supported racial discrimination
also confronted perhaps the most pressing problem facing blacks in postWorld War I America-the lack of
adequate housing in a society facing a
housing shortage.14 Racially restrictive
covenants had been around for years,
and they had become especially prevalent subsequent to the Supreme
Court's holding that local government

could not constitutionally zone neighborhoods according to race. 5 A Chicago
study, commissioned after riots there
in 1919, described a familiar pattern of
cooperation between real estate dealers
and neighborhood associations to create
white-only areas, a system which resulted
in the creation of black ghettos, with
associated problems of poverty, disease, crime, and related social problems. 16 Although World War II brought
with it new economic opportunities,
and hence buying power, the hold of
the covenants reinforced the poverty
of many and significantly restricted
opportunities of the emerging middle
class to move to better housing.17 To a
non-historian who has for several years
taught the opinion in Shelley, but who
was born after it was decided, I was
perhaps most struck by the degree of
organization that characterized the
nationwide litigation of which Shelley
was part.' One is not surprised to discover that segregation in housing was a
target of the NAACP, or that the campaign against the covenants was wellorganized. 9 But it was nevertheless
striking to me that a May, 1946 conference, called by the NAACP and the
Chicago Council Against Racial and
Religious Discrimination, was "sponsored by more than forty labor, civic,
religious, housing and veterans
groups ."20
Various organizations encouraged
and sponsored sociological and legal
writing against the covenants, and the
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10. Id. at 157; R. Kluger, Simple Justice 249 (1977).
Kluger observes, however, that several other local
attorneys were pushing for going forward; Vaughn
was simply the one who pushed everything ahead by
filing for certiorari.
11. The historical record reveals that Vaughn received
relatively little financial assistance either from the
local or national NAACP, and Vaughn "bore special
burdens" in pursuing the case. C. Vose, supranote
3, at 121.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,
69 Yale L.J. 421 (1960).
14. Vose, NAACP Strategy in the Covenant Cases, 6 W.
Res. L. Rev. 101, 104-05 (1955).
15. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
16. Vose, supra note 14, 114-15.
17. Vose, supra note 14, at 104-05.
18. Shelleywas consolidated with McGhee v. Sipes, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948),was decided the same day. In the years leading to Shelley there was litigation in most major
cities of the country.
19. See generally Vose, supra note 14.
20. Id. at 120.
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law reviews were flooded with articles
and student pieces offering the legal
rationales for invalidating racial
covenants.21 Based on efforts that
began at a September, 1947 conference, the NAACP attempted to
coordinate (to the limited extent possible) the filing of amici curiae briefs,
and eventually nineteen such briefs
22
were filed by various organizations.
Perhaps as important as any other
development, at the recommendation
of President Truman's Committee on
Civil Rights, 2 and with the aid of effective lobbying from within and without,
the Truman administration decided to
have the Justice Department file an
amicus curiae brief against restrictive

to ensure that such advertisements
were not run in areas covered by the
covenants.2 1 And, of course, the
covenants were lent support by the
state in the form of anti-miscegenation
statutes, school segregation, and various
other laws and policies that reinforced
the overall climate of racism that
undergirded the system of segregated
housing.
There was, to be sure, much less
coordination among the defenders of
the covenants, even as the cases
winded their way to the Supreme
Court. The associations that sponsored the litigation were local in nature;
there was no equivalent to the NAACP

to pull together those who were working to preserve the old order.2 The
amici curiae briefs filed are nevertheless instructive. Three property-owners'

21. Id.at 130-33.
22. Id. at 133-38, 141.
23. Id. at 138-40.
24. Id.
25. C. Vose, supra note 3, at 112.
26. Id. at 112-13.
27. Id. at 113.
28. For description of these phenomena as to the
related cases, see Id. at 74-99, 122-50.
29. Id. at 77, 199.
30. Id. at 77.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 174-76.

covenants .24
But it was the extent of organization of those seeking to uphold
the covenants that struck me most. In
St. Louis, the Marcus Avenue Improvement Association sponsored the litigation against the Shelleys. 25 With
numerous potential plaintiffs, Mrs.
Fern Kraemer was chosen because her
parents had signed the original restriction.21 Her part was limited to her testimony at trial that she had inherited
the property from a signatory, after
which she was said to have become
nervous and upset over the publicity
generated by the case.27 This pattern of
sponsorship of enforcement actions by
white property owners' associations
and of eventual clashes with organized
advocates of racial equality characterized each of the companion cases to
28
Shelley at the Supreme Court level.
Ironically, then, this "private" dispute
that would turn on the issue as to the
reach of the concept of "public," or
state action, was in an important sense
private in form only. This was a clash of
large groups and interests across the
nation.
The support system, however, went
far beyond property owner associations.
Realtors boards across the nation, as
well as the national realtors' association, wrote the duty to preserve the
racial identity of white neighborhoods
into their codes of professional ethics.28
Newspapers, like the Washington,
D.C. Evening Star, refused to print
advertisements offering restricted property for sale to black people."2 Indeed,
the Star enforced this policy by relying
on citizens' associations for checking
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associations from major cities filed
briefs, along with a federation representing sixty-nine white citizens'
associations in the District of Columbia. 33 In addition, the National Association of Real Estate Boards filed a
brief favoring enforcement of the
covenants.14
Shelley did not end extensive segregation and racial discrimination, even
in the housing industry. The countervailing forces were, and still are,
powerful. In St. Louis, the Real Estate
Exchange zoned the city and forbad
members of the exchange, under pain
of expulsion, from selling property to
blacks within the white zones.15 The
Shelleys' real opponent, the Marcus
Avenue Improvement Association,
organized block committees to place
pressure on anyone who advertised to
blacks." Nationwide, similar steps of
resistance were taken, and discipline
was imposed on real-estate salespersons who arranged transactions involving whites and blacks .17 For some time
after Shelley, the Federal Housing
Administration continued to refuse to
fund loans involving sales to black
families in white residential areas."
And more broadly, over the years the
combination of white flight and pervasive racial discrimination, with and
without institutional support, continued to assure a largely segregated
pattern of housing. 9
Nevertheless, Shelley's impact has
been significant. With respect to the
problem of segregation in housing, the

decision broke the back of the rigid
system of segregation that existed
under the covenants and has enabled
thousands of blacks to purchase homes
they otherwise could not have purchased.
Equally important, the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Shelley cut sharply against
the philosophy that undergirdedPlessy
v. Ferguson's "separate but equal"
doctrine.4 0In addressing the equal protection issue, the Court rejected the
contention that equal enforcement of
all covenants would suffice, concluding
that "[e]qual protection of the laws is
not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities.."41 It is difficult to see how a regime of stateimposed inequality posing as (at most)
surface and tangible equality could
long survive the Court's willingness to
see prohibited discrimination in the
apparent neutrality of state enforcement of private racially restrictive
covenants .4
Most fundamentally, Shelley symbolizes American society's fledgling
efforts at coming to terms with its
heritage of racial discrimination. The
tide had begun to turn, as more and
more Americans preceived the vicious lies that undergirded the regime
of segregation and white supremacy. If
it in some ways seems remarkable, at
least to this writer, that the prestigious
American Law Institute endorsed the
legality and desirability of racially re4
strictive covenants as late as 1944, 2 it
is also moving that so many were
awakened to the need for fundamental
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change in American race relations.
Though Shelley was neither the beginning nor the end of this long-developing,
and not yet completed, process of
transformation, it is an important
landmark on the path that leads to the
fulfillment of Dr. Martin Luther King's
dream. For this reason alone, the case
is worth remembering.

]].
If Shelley marks an important point
in the progress of American race
relations, it may be even more significant as a symbol of the vexing search
for the boundaries between purely
private and state action and, more
specifically, the reach of the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment in a
changing world. As we shall see, Shelley
can be read as a watershed decision
that in a single stroke (1) eliminated
the independent significance of the Supreme Court's long-adopted state action
doctrine; and (2) lent significant
momentum to an emerging view of
equal protection as calling forth at
least some affirmative state duties to
provide individuals or groups with aid
in obtaining access to basic human
goods or needs.
While both of these understandings
of Shelley are controversial, and neither
would necessarily be embraced explicitly
by the Supreme Court today, understanding Shelley from these perspectives may render it most coherent and
better enable us to see the long-term
currents of American constitutional
change. In gaining such perspective,
we may better perceive some basic ten33. Id. at 197-98.
34. Id. at 199.
35. Id. at 223.
36. Id. at 224.
37. Id.
38, Id. at 225.
39. See, e.g., Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 118-23 (1968) (indicating
extent and causes of persistent racial segregation in
housing throughout the nation).
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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41. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22.
42. See Comment, supra note 8, at 366.
43. Restatement (First) of Property sect. 406, comment
1,at 2411 (1944). For discussion, see C. Vose,supra
note 3, at 4-5. The most striking thing about the

Restatement position, which was after all an
accurate description of the holdings of most courts,
was the sense of denial it conveyed. The comment
referred hypothetically to covenants as to "Buddists, Communists, or Mohammedans," when the
social problem associated with the covenants was
obviously that of racial discrimination against
blacks.
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sions in American political thought and
confront the dilemma posed by such
tensions for constitutional decisionmaking. If Shelley can thus illuminate a
great deal about modem controversy
in constitutional law, this provides
another important reason to mark the
decision as we observe the bicentennial of the Constitution.
Law students confront Shelley in the
section of their casebook dealing with
the Fourteenth Amendment state action
requirement. This requirement flows
partly from the text-section one
reads that "No State shall . .. " -but
perhaps even more fundamentally
from the conventional understanding
of constitutional rights as regulating
the relationship between individuals
and the state rather than the relationship
among individuals. 44 With respect to
equal protection, the underlying assumption, rooted in liberal political theory,
was that in general government does
not act to harm an individual's interests,
or the right to equal protection, by
allowing the "natural" forces of individual
choice (the market) to operate.
In this traditional view, the state's
failure to act constituted a denial of
equal protection only when it involves
a (perhaps willful) failure to enforce
legal rights found in the positive or
common law of the state or in the
federal constitution. 4 The systematic
refusal to protect blacks against lawless behavior of white persecutors, for
example, literally denied them the
"protection" guaranteed them. But
viewing state failure to enforce preexisting rights as denial of equal protection did not erode the traditional
view that equal protection does not
create any affirmative duties on the
state to ensure any sort of equality
except (a fairly constrained concept of)
equality before the law."5 Modem
inroads on the traditional constraint of
the state action requirement are
generally rooted in a changing vision of
the meaning and application of the
underlying constitutional protection.
Shelley is a hard case because
racially restrictive covenants appear as
classic examples of the purely private
discrimination that the Fourteenth
Amendment has traditionally been
held not to reach. It appears that the
state merely acquiesces in private discrimination that is not prohibited by

ST. LOUIS BAR JOURNAL

pre-existing law. Nevertheless, adopting an argument set forth in a wellknown law review article, 7 the Supreme
Court converted Shelley into a seemingly
easy case by finding that judicial enforcement of the covenants constituted
the required state action. 48 The Court
acknowledged that the restrictive covenants themselves were purely private
and that therefore they were valid so
long as the parties voluntarily adhered
to their terms."
Even so, given that "judicial action
is not immunized from the operation of
[the Fourteenth Amendment], "' the
Court concluded that the state had
acted discriminatorily. And with the
state action problem solved, the court
quickly rejected the view that state
neutrality was demonstrated by the
equal enforcement of all covenants,
without regard to race. Considering
that Fourteenth Amendment rights are
"personal rights," the Court reasoned,
it is "no answer to these petitioners to
say that the courts may also be induced
to deny white persons rights of ownership
and occupancy on grounds of race or
color." 5'
But hard cases are not so easily converted into easy ones. It is not difficult
to sense the Court's sleight of hand, at
least by reference to traditional starting points. No one doubts that judicial
activity is "state action;" the question
is necessarily whether that sort of state
action can make the state accountable
for the racial discrimination originating in private agreements. While one
can choose to say that enforcement of
racial covenants deny rights of ownership
and occupancy "on grounds of race and
color," one might as plausibly assert
that these rights were "denied" because,
given the private covenants, they simply were never brought into existence
by a valid transaction. As Herbert
Wechsler put it, rather than calling
judicial enforcement of racial covenants "a state discrimination," we
might as well have called it "a legal
recognition of the freedom of the
52
individual.
It is perhaps easy to see that some
state involvements in private discrimination, such as the uniform provision of fire and police service, are so
neutral as to not implicate the state in
that discriminatory behavior. But judicial enforcement of valid private rights
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arguably is neutral in much the way.
The right to obtain enforcement of
legally recognized rights is a traditional
civil right, one that is prominently
included in the Civil Rights Act of
1866 on which the Fourteenth Amendment was based. 3 Many state con-

44. The classic formulation is in the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
45. See, e.g., Frantz, CongressionalPowerto Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73
Yale L.J. 1353 (1964).
46. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised
Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 479-80 & n. 11.
47. McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State
Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements,
Covenants or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional,
33 Calif. L. Rev. 5 (1945).
48. 334 U.S. at 14-18.
49. Id. at 13-14.
50. Id. at 18.
51. Id. at 22.
52. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1959).
53. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act guaranteed to
blacks the "full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property." See 42 U.S.C. sect. 1982 (current
codification).
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stitutions include provisions that
guarantee access to the courts to
enforce private rights.54 In terms of
modem equal protection doctrine, it is
difficult to find that state enforcement
of racial covenants invokes an explicit
racial classification, evidences a discriminatory purpose on the part of the
state, or is without a rational basis.
Equally troubling, if the state becomes
fully accountable for the exercise of
private rights whenever the machinery
of the state is required to make them
effective, it would appear that a startling range of private decisions would
suddenly become subject to constitutional constraints. The classic
example is the individual home-owner
who must rely on state power, in the
form of assistance of law enforcement
personnel and judicial enforcement of
trespass laws,to make effective his discriminatory decision not to be a host to
a black dinner party guest." Since
neither the Supreme Court nor the
commentators are willing to extend the
principle of Shelley to such a case, we
are struck by the Court's failure to
articulate any limiting principle that
would square its state action holding
with the assumptions that have been
thought to undergird the requirement.
Discussion of the Shelley opinion
thus raises several main themes. First,
notice that the discussion of state

action shades into the issue as to the
reach of the equal protection clause.
The state always holds some relationship
to discriminatory behavior-even nonaction can be seen as a form of "state
action"-and the question becomes
whether the equal protection clause
requires the state to act other than as it
does. This is why so many commentators look most immediately to Shelley to
develop the case for the view that that
state action should not survive as an
independent question.5 6
Second, not surprisingly, in the
years since Shelley commentators have
sought a meaningful account of its
holding and a principled description of
its boundaries, whether in terms of the
state action limitation or equal protection law. Finally, a question raised is
whether Shelley can be reconciled with
the liberal political underpinnings of
state action and equal protection
described above. A brief review of the
principle alternative rationales will
point up the enduring nature of the
questions raised by the case.
Most commentators have sought to
avoid some of the problems created by
Shelley's emphasis on judicial enforcement by focusing the search for state
action on the state common law policy
of recognizing the legal validity of
racially restrictive covenants. Given
that traditional state policy in most

states was not to prohibit most forms
of private racial discrimination, however,
there has remained the need to explicate why mere recognition of the
validity of the covenants violates equal
protection norms as well as to offer a
meaningful limiting principle. Several
alternatives have been offered.
One explanatory (and limiting) principle focuses on the right to own and
dispose of property as a basic civil
right. The 1866 Civil Rights Act provided that "[a]ll citizens of the United
States shall have the same right ... as is
enjoyed by white citizens ... to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property.""' Racially
restrictive covenants, on this view,
have the effect of preventing black
citizens from being able to purchase
and hold real property on equal terms
with whites and thus interferes with
the enjoyment of this basic civil right. 5
This argument's equal protection
credentials are arguably enhanced by
the Supreme Court's decision in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,9 holding that
the 1866 Act prohibits private discrimination in housing. The 1866 Act
was, after all, the pattern for section
60
one of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The central issue raised is whether
the equal "right" to own and enjoy protects a purchaser against a private party's discriminatory covenant. Alternatively, this "right" may only stand in
opposition to legally-imposed restrictions on property rights. Traditionally,
the "right" to own and enjoy property
did not speak to private discrimination, and most scholarly commentators
have viewed Jones as a misconstruc-

54. E.g., III. Const. art. 1, sect. 12.
55. See Wechsler, supra note, at 29-30. The examples
could be proliferated, such as whether Shelley prohibits the legal effectuation of testamentary dispositions with religious or racial conditions attached.
Id.
56. E.g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 116870 (1978); Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the
Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349,
1352 (1982); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for
"State Action" 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1957).
57. See 42 U.S. C. sect. 1982 (current codification).
58. Indeed, the Court in Shelley pointed to the Civil
Rights Act in deciding Shelley, though it did not rest
its decision on the statute. 334 U.S. at 10-11.
59. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
60. See R. Berger, Government by Judiciary 20-36
(1977).
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tion of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.6"
Ironically, despite the equal protection
clause's more open-textured language,
the Supreme Court has through the
years asserted that even equal protection does not of itself prohibit voluntary private discrimination in housing. 2
Moreover, unless the property right
principle were artificially limited to
protecting only the interests of willing
sellers and buyers ,63it may not provide
the needed limit. After all, a guest in a
private home holds a sort of property
interest called a license. While licenses
traditionally could be withdrawn at
will, it was equally clear prior to Shelley
that property interests could be contractually limited so as to preclude a
valid conveyance to members of the
black race. If such definitions of property rights are unconstitutional because
they deny more basic acquisition rights
to blacks, we are still in need of an
explanation as to the point at which
such rights may be said to give way,
and as to why.
An alternative is to contend that
state law reveals its lack of neutrality
by failing to apply the traditional prohibition on unreasonable restraints on
alienation as to racially restrictive
covenants .64 Racial covenants had a
tremendous impact on the alienability
of land and do seem to cut against the
traditional values favoring alienability.
Racial covenants were defended on the
ground that they were less complete
than the total prohibitions on alienability
condemned at common law. Even so,
many have suspected that in a context
not infected with pervasive racism the
covenants may well have been condemned by courts seeking to explicate
the underlying policies at stake in this
area of property law.65
The "unreasonable restraints" rationale
for Shelley, however, is not likely to
yield much satisfaction. To begin, even
the few courts that found that the covenants ran afoul of the common law
principle favoring alienability nevertheless found that similar covenants against
use and occupancy would not run afoul
of the principle. 6 While use and
occupancy covenants create the same
result, the distinction between use and
alienation restrictions is firmly rooted
in the law of property. If there is something non-neutral, or violative of equal
protection, about recognizing the validity

ST. LOUIS BAR JOURNAL

of racial covenants, it is the unacceptability of the law of the state permitting this kind of pervasive disadvantagement of a race of people rather
than significant incongruity with the
balance of common law property
rules.
Finally, as with the redescription of
the "right" to property described
above, the theory based on the
"unreasonable restraints" doctrine
informs us that the state must not
stand by and allow pervasive racial discrimination to occur, but without offering a constitutional theory by way of
justification. In both cases, however,
traditional notions that the state may,
if it chooses, establish a neutral posture toward private discrimination is
undercut. While both rationales focus
on property rights, no reason appears
why the same approach to "rights"
could not be extended to settings
beyond both race and property. As
explications of Shelley, they are at most
starting points rather than complete
theories.
A potentially more fruitful approach
to explaining and limiting the decision
would be to focus more on the nature of
the private activity involved than on

the legal rules that sanction it. Two
years prior to Shelley the Supreme
Court in March v. Alabama 7 applied
the First Amendment to the act of dis61. See C. Fairman, 6 History of the Supreme Court of
the United States, Reconstruction and Reunion:
1874-1888,at 1207-58 (1971); Henkin, On Drawing
Lines, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 82-87 (1968). But see
Levinson, Book Review, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 461
(1971).
62. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (acknowledging that state neutrality toward private discrimination is acceptable if state does not in some
way act to encourage or authorize the discrimination).
63. As, for example, in Justice Vinson's dissenting view
inBarrowsv. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), that a
damage remedy is distinguishable from the equitable relief sought in Shelley because it operates
directly against the breaching covenantor rather
than against the third party who entered into a contract with a willing seller. For a similar view and its
critique, compare Pollak, Racial Discriminationand
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959), with Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083, 11091114 (1960).
64. See generally Choper, Thoughts in State Action,
1979 Wash. U. L. Q. 757, 769-71.
65. For useful discussion, see C. Vose, supra note 3, at
19-22. Vose observes that a few courts did invalidate
racial covenants as restraints on alienation, finding
that such pervasive limits on sale for such an extended group of people effectively deprived the fee
simple possessor of complete ownership.
66. E.G., White v. White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150 S.E.
531 (1929).
67. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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tributing religious literature on the
sidewalk of a privately-owned company town. The Court reasoned that
the private town was engaged in a
public function and was thus subject to
freedom of speech restrictions .68 It has
been contended that since the system
of putting racial covenants in place had
the effect of closing off entire areas of
cities, it amounted to a form of private
zoning that effectively performed a
public function subject to con69
stitutional constraints.
This reading claims the virtue of
explaining and limiting Shelley by
reference to the systematic discrimination represented by the covenants. It
poses no threat to homeowners'decisions
about their guests. It also seems plausible, in part because the system of covenants appear to have been virtually
imposed on districts by a well-organized
minority and to have worked against
the will of later buyers and sellers who
had little effective choice with respect
to them. State recognition of the
validity of the covenants, and its enforcement of them, might thus be
viewed as a delegation of a public
function.
The covenants differed from governmental zoning, of course, in that no
original homeowner ever had the decision literally imposed on her as a
regulation from without; she understood
it to be an agreement with others based
on mutual consideration. That such
agreements were voluntary is shown by
the fact that many housing districts

included covenants that were signed
by less than a hundred per cent of the
owners. Even later owners of the property had the choice whether to buy
property that was so encumbered,
though admittedly the extent of the
covenants would have impacted on the
extent of meaningful freedom the
buyer enjoyed. In any event, given that
the purpose of private covenants is
always to regulate the use and disposition of property, it might be contended
that it is odd to describe that very function as governmental simply because
many property owners are involved.
To the extent that we are applying
the Supreme Court's more recent standard requiring that a "public function"
is one "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State," restrictive covenants
probably do not qualify.70 It has been
observed, however, that the Court's
more recent formulations downplay
the emphasis in Marsh v. Alabama and
other cases on the relevance of the
extent of the power of private groups to
impact on constitutional values in
determining whether they perform a
"public function." 7' The point is well
taken, but it perhaps proves too much,
at least to the extent that the use of
public function analysis is intended to
preserve a link between Shelley and
the traditional assumptions underlying
state action doctrine.
If private power to affect constitutional values is the key, it would
appear that the less formal methods
for ensuring segregation in housing
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68. Id.
69. E.g., Lewis, supra note 63, at 1116-20; Groner &
Helfeld, Race Discriminationin Housing, 57 Yale
L.J. 426, 454 (1948).
70. Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
352 (1974); accord,FlaggBros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 157 (1978).
71. E.g., G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein, & M.
Tushnet, ConstitutionalLaw 1528 (1986) [hereinafter cited as G. Stone]. The suggestion made is that a
private group's action may be viewed as " 'public'
because its power rivaled that of the state, rather
than because of any particular function it had
assumed." Id. at 1524.
72. Steele v. Louisville & NR.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
73. Indeed, Justice Douglas once contended that the
pattern of discriminatory practices of builders, real
estate brokers, and mortgage lenders constituted
private zoning and hence created a state duty to
retain fair housing legislation. Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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That the "delegation" of power to
regulate the use and alienability of
property is probably not the key to
Shelley is illustrated by the treatment
that non-racial property restrictions
receive by modem courts. Use regulations
promulgated and enforced by modern
homeowners -associations by and large
have been treated as private in nature,
though subject to statutory or public
policy limitations.7 4 In a number of
instances, use regulations that would
have been questionable as public zoning restrictions have been upheld as
valid private restrictions.7' The key to
Shelley appears to be the quest for
racial equality and an evolving sense of
the concept of equal citizenship, rather
than any uniform concept of public
function.
With this key in mind, Shelley is best
understood as a holding that, at least in
the narrow context of the racial discrimination that has effectively denied
the promise of freedom and equality to
blacks, state neutrality in the face of
debilitating patterns of discrimination
amounts to a denial of equal protection
of the laws. It is true, as noted above,
that the holding in Shelley has been
limited in application to racial covenants, and not in fact extended to
private racial discrimination in housing
generally. But this limit seems more
formal than substantive in nature and
reflects that "judicial enforcement" (or
"public function") provides a hook for
making Shelley appear to square with
the traditional notions underlying the
state action doctrine. This should not,
however, blind us to the reality that
Shelley is a new doctrine for a new
time, and that it necessarily rests on
the affirmative duty of the state to
ensure a level of racial equality at the
cost of limiting private liberty.
For many, this analysis of Shelley
can only be disturbing. It seems
reasonably clear that the decision to
place the value of equality over liberty
as to racial discrimination in housing
would not have been the choice of most
of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The assumption underlying the state action doctrine and the
equal protection clause was that, by
and large, private liberty could be preserved while guaranteeing equality
before the law. The decision to buy,
sell, or encumber property would
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almost certainly have been conceived
as within the private sphere. Even the
Congress that enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, which included many
framers, would probably not have
enacted the provisions of modem fair
7
housing legislation. 6

It is true that the 1875 Act did prohibit private discrimination as to transportation, inns and hotels, and places
of public amusement. And some proponents of the Act contended that
features of these licensed and regulated
businesses lent them a "public" character
that carried with it a duty of nondiscrimination and created a civil right77
of access to all members of the public .

74. See Ellickson, Cities andHomeowners Associations,
130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1519, 1528 (1982).
75. Professor Ellickson observes that age discrimination as well as such mundane regulations as those
dealing with exterior paint colors have been upheld,
even though they would be of doubtful validity if
contained in municipal zoning ordinances. Id.
76 For development of this view, see Avins, AntiDiscriminationLegislation in Housing: A Denial of
Freedom of Choice, in Open Occupancy v. Forced
Housing Under the Fourteenth Amendment 3 (A.
Avins ed. 1963).
77. indeed Senator Sumner expressed his view this
way: "Show me, therefore, a legal institution, anything created or regulated by law, and I show you what
must be opened equally to all without distinction of
color." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242
(1871), quoted in Frank & Munro, The Original
Understandingof "EqualProtection of the Laws,"
1972 Wash. U. L.Q. 421, 456 n.125.
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The more common defense of the
legislation, however, focused on the
common law right of access that purportedly existed as to each type of
accomodation and the alleged failure
of the states to enforce these common
8
law rights.
Seen in this light, the Act arguably
only remedied the breach of the rather
prosaic affirmative state duty to enforce
pre-existing rights. It was acknowledged that the purpose of the bill
was to provide "a more efficient remedy"
for the breach of these common law
duties. 71 Indeed, at least one proponent even stated that the states could
change their laws with respect to these
facilities-presumably so as generally
to permit arbitrary discriminationbut that they could not require nondiscrimination in general and then
authorize discrimination toward
blacks8 0
But other evidence suggests that the
traditional "liberal" paradigm of public

and private action was never as pure a
conception as we sometimes assume.
Congress had previously enacted legislation against discrimination by public
conveyances, including the amendment of railroad charters to require
non-discrimination on the basis of race
as to any car."' Those who rejected
arguments on behalf of segregation
and the right to discriminate based
their vote on a conception of basic civil
rights which common law rights of
equal access embodied. 2 This history
buttresses the claim that "the equal
protection clause, in the eyes of its contemporaries, froze into constitutional
law the existing common law obligation
of transportation companies to take all
commers and to eliminate any possibility
of their segregation." 3 Moreover, the
1875 Act itself did not provide any
exceptions for states that had eliminated
(or never adopted) such common law
rights of access as to inns or places of
public amusement, despite opposition
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argument that many states did not
require non-discrimination in these
areas at common law.84
Whatever the views of the supporters of the 1875 Act, however, the
statute teaches us something. The
common law recognized that some
activities of private parties take on a
public quality about them because of
the nature of the rights and interests
affected, the authority granted to the
actor by the state, or by virtue of the
expectations generated by customary
practice that gives rise to common law
rules. Discrimination by public conveyances and inns, for example, would
have impacted adversely on the meaningful enjoyment of the right to travel, a
traditional civil right, especially in the
days when inns were few and far
between.
While this form of reasoning was
never applied to the acquisition of
housing at common law, this common
law insight at least prefigures the
possibility of such an application in a
positive state in which people now harbor expectations of state aid in various
forms. Shelley must rest on a proposition that private racial discrimination
that affects basic interests implicates
equal protection concerns precisely
because true equality, even equality
before the law, will be absent without
state intervention just as the right to
travel would have been undercut without
regulation of common carriers and
inns. This application of equal protection is thus of a piece with the holdings
that the right to counsel implies a state
duty to supply an indigent with counsel," and that equal protection requires

78. See Avins, The CivilRights Act of 1875: Some Reflected Light in the FourteenthAmendment and Public
Accomodations, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1967).
79, 2 Cong. Rec. 4082 (Senator Frelinghuysen), quoted
in, Avins, supra note 78, at 903.
80. Avins, supra note 78, at 903 (summarizing Senator
Frelinghuysen's remarks).
81. Frank & Munro, supra note 77, at 452-56.
82. Id. at 452-53. Even Senator Reverdy Johnson, the
thoughtful conservative Senator who later opposed
the Fourteenth Amendment, drew upon the familiar
distinction between "civil" rights and mere "social"
rights in supporting the legislation.
83. Id. at 455.
84. See Id. at 456; Avins, supra note, at 896 & n.
125.
85. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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the state to waive expenses to indigents
on appeal. 8 6 Shelley suggests that the
pursuit of racial equality, in some fairly
rich sense, is a fundamental right; that
right, however, is extended in Shelley
beyond any original understanding of
equal protection.
Two points may be added to those
already made. First, the main limitation to Shelley suggested by this
analysis is the recognition that it
speaks to state duties with respect to
racial equality and not necessarily to
all other contexts. While the issue of
racial equality has a special force in
American history and law, a question
raised is whether the positive character of the right recognized can be thus
cabined in the long run. In the short
run, it appears that the Supreme Court
is back to a theory of state action that is
in tension with Shelley, in part because
its members sense that a general
recognition of duties of intervention is
the name of equal protection, beyond
the narrow list of fundamental rights
elaborated to date, would enmesh the
Court more deeply yet in the difficult
task of evaluating the competing
claims of private groups in our society.
As to the reach of Shelley in the area
of race, the Court has drawn its own
boundaries but has never adequately
explained Shelley. The most articulate
alternatives propose a frank balancing
of interests, the elaboration and application of the notion of customary public
expectations as to equal treatment,
and focus on the question as to when
the demand for equal treatment runs
up against constitutional constraints
based on privacy and association
interests.

7

In the end, each approach

seeks to strike a balance between the
goal of racial equality and competing
values of constitutional weight.
Second, if Shelley is best explained
as described here, and not by reference
to judicial enforcement or public function, it appears to at least cut against
the Supreme Court's more recent doctrine requiring a discriminatory purpose where a racial classification is not
present." Shelley can be seen as
rejecting the state indifference to the
impact of its policy of giving effect to
private discrimination in the manner
that it did. In turn, to the extent that
Shelley is based on the state's failure to
take account of the actual impact of its
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policy of indifference to the results of
private ordering, it shares a common
premise with contentions for a more
aggressive approach to defining the
reach of Brown v. Board ofEducation 9
and in support of affirmative action.90
Of one thing there is no room for
doubt: Shelley is worth remembering
for its current relevance, as well as for
its historical impact.El

86. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
87. See Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 Stan. L.
Rev. 3 (1961); Lewis, The Role of Law in Regulating
Discriminationin Placesof PublicAccomodation, 13
Buff. L. Rev. 402 (1964); Henkin, supra note 47.
88. The "purpose" requirement was set forth in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and
remains controversial to the present day.
89. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

90. Shelley shares with the modern impulse for affirmative action the premise that state neutrality can be
invidious when it fails to take into account the
effects of past or present racial discrimination in
formulating policies as to race. Some would defend
affirmative action against constitutional challenge
precisely on the ground that the state should be
viewed as having an affirmative duty to remedy the
effects of past discrimination. See G. Stone, supra
note 71, at 608-09.
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